The Rambouillet Agreement was a proposed peace agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and a delegation representing the Albanian majority population of Kosovo. It was drafted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and named for the Château de Rambouillet, where it was initially proposed. The significance of the agreement lies in the fact that Yugoslavia refused to accept it, which NATO used as justification to start the Kosovo War. Belgrade’s rejection was based on the argument that the agreement contained provisions for Kosovo’s autonomy that went further than the Serbian/Yugoslav government saw as reasonable. The biggest problem for both sides was that the Albanians were unwilling to accept a solution that would retain Kosovo as part of Serbia, whilst the Serbs did not want to see the pre-1990 status quo restored, and they were implacably opposed to any international role in the governance of the province, including the offer of a face-saving measure wherein blue-helmeted UN peacekeeping troops would be used instead of NATO troops. The two paragraphs above, however, are partially contradicted by the historical evidence. In particular, the statement by the co-chairmen on 23 February 1999 that the negotiations have led to a consensus on substantial autonomy for Kosovo, including on mechanisms for free and fair elections to democratic institutions, for the governance of Kosovo, for the protection of human rights and the rights of members of national communities; and for the establishment of a fair judicial system. They went on to say that a political framework is now in place leaving the further work of finalizing the implementation Chapters of the Agreement, including the modalities of the invited international civilian and military presence in Kosovo. Effective control of the media by the Clinton White House ensured that the prevailing opinion before the start of the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia was that the Yugoslav Government had rejected all attempts to negotiate an agreement on the future of Kosovo. The so-called Rambouillet Accords had been offered to the Yugoslavs and rejected, leaving NATO no option but to start aerial bombardment on March 24, 1999. But that was far from the truth. On March 15, 1999, meeting in Paris, the key parties to the problem had already reached and signed an “Agreement for Self-Government in Kosovo and Metohija. With this already agreed, was there justification for a military attack? The Agreement offers literally everything demanded by the Kosovo community except the demand by the KLA, which drafted the so-called Rambouillet Accords which were never discussed at all with the Yugoslav Government before being presented to it as à fait accompli, two days after the ultimatum had been published as “the final agreement” in a KLA newspaper in Albania. The Houston Chronicle on March 28, 1999, published an insightful article on the Kosovo situation. The article, by Dr Ronald L. Hatchett, Director of the Center for International Studies at the University of St. Thomas, was entitled Would You Sign This Agreement?, and dealt with the peace accord on Kosovo put forward by the US and its allies at Rambouillet, France. The treaty which was put forward at the last minute was not what the Yugoslav Government had been told it would be. As a result, the Belgrade delegation had no option but to refuse to sign it, as was presumably the intention of US Secretary of State Madeline Albright. The uncompleted Rambouillet Accords noted: “Kosovo will have a President, Prime Minister and Government, an Assembly, its own Supreme Court, Constitutional Court and other Courts and Prosecutors.”, “Kosovo will have the authority to make laws not subject to revision by Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including levying taxes, instituting programs of economic, scientific, technological, regional and social development, conducting foreign relations within its area of responsibility in the same manner as a Republic.” , “Yugoslav Army forces will withdraw completely from Kosovo, except for a limited border guard force (active only within a five kilometer border zone).” , “Serb security forces [police] will withdraw completely from Kosovo except for a limited number of border police (active only within a five kilometer border zone).” , “The parties invite NATO to deploy a military force (KFOR), which will be authorized to use necessary force to ensure compliance with the Accords.” , “The Chief of the CIM has the authority to issue binding directives to the Parties on all important matters as he sees fit, including appointing and removing officials and curtailing institutions.” , “Three years after the implementation of the Accords, an international meeting will be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo on the basis of the will of the people.” , The Accords, had they been signed by the Yugoslav Government, would have meant an immediate effective removal of Kosovo from Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav delegation had been prepared to hand over autonomy to Kosovars in day-to-day matters, including religious, education and health care matters and local government operations. The Yugoslav delegation, however, was told: sign the “surprise” version of the Rambouillet Accords or face immediate NATO bombing. So now you see why is this document crucial for latter developments not only in Balkans, but in entire world? This was the first time that US and NATO acted behind United Nations back. What happened in Syria just a few weeks ago with Donald Trump “intervention”? What the UN said? That begs the question, did we really can rely on UN or UN lost its legality? Where is International Law today?
M.S. Min
